Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2000

The State of Utah v. Dyan Lynn Martinez : Reply
Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Karen A. Klucznik; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee.
Patrick W. Corum; Joan C. Watt; Ralph W. Dellapiana; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorney for
Defendant/Appellant.
PATRICK W. CORUM (9216) JOAN C. WATT (3967) RALPH W. DELLAPIANA (6861) SALT
LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 424 East 500 South, Suite 300 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK (7912) ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL MARK L. SHURTLEFF
(4666) ATTORNEY GENERAL HeberM. Wells Building 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor P. O. Box
140854 Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Martinez, No. 20001063 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3025

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

DYAN LYNN MARTINEZ,

:

Case No. 20001063-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Priority No. 2

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for Workers' Compensation Insurance
Fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-110 (1998), and
Attempted Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled/Counterfeit Substance, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(ii) (1998), in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Roger A. Livingston, Judge, presiding.
PATRICK W. CORUM (9216)
JOAN C. WATT (3967)
RALPH W. DELLAPIANA (6861)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK (7912)
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
ATTORNEY GENERAL
HeberM. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P. O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee

FILED
Utah Coun of ^urwta

MAR 2 8 2002
Pauistta Stagg
Clerk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

DYAN LYNN MARTINEZ,

:

Case No. 20001063-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Priority No. 2

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for Workers' Compensation Insurance
Fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-110 (1998), and
Attempted Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled/Counterfeit Substance, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(ii) (1998), in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Roger A. Livingston, Judge, presiding.
PATRICK W. CORUM (9216)
JOAN C. WATT (3967)
RALPH W. DELLAPIANA (6861)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

KAREN A. KLUCZNIK (7912)
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
ATTORNEY GENERAL
HeberM. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P. O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

1

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ORDINARY
SENTENCING AND THE IMPOSITION OF RESTITUTION
REQUIRES HIGHER EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS
4

POINT II.

THE SENTENCING COURT DID IN FACT ORDER
RESTITUTION BASED UPON CONDUCT FOR WHICH MSMARTINEZ WAS NOT CONVICTED. DID NOT ADMIT. OR
DID NOT PLEAD GUILTY
7

POINT III.

RELIANCE ON THE TRIPLE AND OUADRUPLE HEARSAY
OF THE PSR WAS PLAIN ERROR
13

POINT IV. THE STATE HAS ATTEMPTED TO SHIFT THE BURDEN OF
PROOF ONTO MS. MARTINEZ
17
A. The State Presented No Reliable Evidence to Support the
Sentencing Court's Conclusion That Dr. Dall Would Not Have
Prescribed Oxycontin Had He Known Ms. Martinez Had Worked
Under An Assumed Name
18
B. The Sentencing Court Had a Legal Duty to Determine the Actual
Damages Suffered By WCF
19
POINT V.
CONCLUSION

MS. MARTINEZ' CLAIMS WERE ADEQUATELY
BRIEFED

23
25

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

FEDERAL CASES
Gardner v.Florida. 430 U.S. 349 (1977)
Wasman v. United States. 468 U.S. 559 (1984)

14
5

STATE CASES
First Security Bank of Utah. N.A. v. Banberrv Crossing. 780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989) . 20
Monson v. Carver. 928 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1996)

4

State ex rel W.S.. 939 P.2d 196 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)

15

State v. Anderson. 833 P.2d 321 (Or. Ct. App. 1992)

5, 14

State v. Betha. 957 P.2d 611 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)

22

State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993)

21

State v. Gomez. 887 P.2d 853 (Utah 1994)

14

State v. Hoffine. 2001 UT 4,20 P.3d 265

22

State v. Houston. 2000 UT App 242,9 P.3d 188

5, 18

State v.Howell. 707 P.2d 115 (Utah 1985)

5,14

State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1993)
State v. Lipskv. 608 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1980)
itate v. Rhodes. 818 P.2d 1048 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)

1,2,3, 6, 8, 13,14,15,16, 17
13,14
14

Page
State v. Sanwick. 713 P.2d 707 (Utah 1986)
State v. Watson. 1999 UT App 273,987 P.2d 1289
State v. Weeks. 2000 UT App 273,12 P.3d 110

5
5, 6, 9
12

STATE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999)

3,6

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(l)(c) (1999)

6, 7, 20

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (1999)

23

Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9)

23

iii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.
DYAN LYNN MARTINEZ,

:

Case No. 20001063-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Priority No. 2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Point I: Even ordinary sentencing decisions such as fines and jail time
must be based on "reasonably reliable and relevant information/1 State v. Johnson. 856
P.2d 1064,1071 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). However, the non-punitive goal of
restitution requires that higher evidentiary standards be used than for ordinary sentencing
decisions. For instance, the State must show by a preponderance of the evidence both
that the defendant's admitted misconduct caused pecuniary damage and the amount of
that damage. Also, in determining restitution, the sentencing court may only take into
account the defendant's admitted conduct, not unproven allegations. Moreover,
restitution may only be imposed based on information that would be admissible in a civil
action and would support a civil judgement.
Both the State and the sentencing court have failed to adhere to the higher
evidentiary standards of restitution. This failure affected all aspects of the sentencing
court's determination that Ms. Martinez' admitted misconduct of working under an

assumed name caused in pecuniary damages. Specifically, if the required restitution
evidentiary standards had been used, Ms. Martinez would not have been ordered to pay
restitution in the amount of $14,647.
Point II: In its brief, the State incorrectly asserts that the sentencing court had
sufficient evidence with which to determine that Ms. Martinez' admitted misconduct
resulted in pecuniary damages. Such an argument ignores the fact that the sentencing
court's restitution determination was almost exclusively based upon conduct for which
Ms. Martinez was not convicted, did not admit responsibility, and did not plead guilty.
Moreover, even if the sentencing court had not erroneously considered such
information, the remaining evidence that could conceivably support the award of
restitution is inherently unreliable, demonstrably false, and directly contradicted by
reliable evidence.
Point III: The State mistakenly urges this Court to conclude that, absent
express challenge, presentence reports are inherently reliable and, thus, immunefromthe
requirement of Johnson that any sentencing decision not be based upon double and triple
hearsay. However, the cases relied upon by the State simply do not support such a
conclusion.
Furthermore, Ms. Martinez did raise numerous objections to the contents and the
accuracy of the presentence report prepared in her case (the "PSR"). As such, the
sentencing court was on notice that the information contained in the PSR was inaccurate

2

and unreliable. Thus, the sentencing court's continued reliance upon the double, triple,
and quadruple hearsay in the PSR was plain error under Johnson.
Point IV: In challenging Ms. Martinez5 claim of insufficiency of the evidence,
the State attempts to impermissibly shift the burdens of production and proof onto Ms.
Martinez. During the sentencing hearing, the court stated that it was imposing restitution
based, in part, on the erroneous belief that Dr. Dall would not have prescribed Oxycontin
based on Ms. Martinez' admitted misconduct of working under an assumed name.
However, the only reliable evidence suggests that Ms. Martinez would, and did, receive
Oxycontin from Dr. Dall even though he was aware of her previous part-time
employment.
Moreover, even if Ms. Martinez would not have received Oxycontin, the
sentencing court had a duty under the Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999) to impose
restitution for only actual costs incurred by Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah
("WCF"). Because Ms. Martinez was entitled to receive medical and prescription
benefits, regardless of any criminal conduct, the actual pecuniary damages would be the
cost of the Oxycontin received minus the cost of the medication she would have
otherwise received. Nevertheless, when alerted to the fact that Methadone would not
have been prescribed, the sentencing court neglected its duty under the statute to use an
appropriate offset to the cost of Oxycontin.
Furthermore, despite the State's argument to the contrary, Ms. Martinez did not

3

invite the sentencing court's error in not using an offset merely by correctly asserting that
Methadone was not an appropriate medication and would not have been prescribed to
her. By making her argument, Ms. Martinez did not assume the State's burden to show
the correct amount of actual damages suffered by WCF.
Point V: Ms. Martinez' claim that the sentencing court failed to resolve the
many inaccuracies in the PSR was adequately briefed. Numerous times over the course
of the sentencing hearing, Ms. Martinez brought inaccuracies in the PSR to the court's
attention. Moreover, Ms. Martinez correctly cited to these portions of the record in her
brief.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ORDINARY
SENTENCING AND THE IMPOSITION OF RESTITUTION
REQUIRES HIGHER EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS .

The sentencing court and the State failed to recognize the fundamental difference
between ordinary sentencing and the imposition of restitution. As stated by the Utah
Supreme Court, "it is clear from the legislative scheme that restitution is not a
'punishment' but a civil penalty whose purpose is entirely remedial, i.e. to compensate
victims for the harm caused by a defendant and whose likely intent is to spare victims the
time, expense, and emotional difficulties of separate litigation to recover their damages
from the defendant." Monson v. Carver. 928 P.2d 1017, 1027 (Utah 1996). Because of
this non-punitive goal, restitution requires higher evidentiary standards than those used
for ordinary sentencing.
4

For instance, before restitution may be ordered, the State must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence both that the defendant's admitted misconduct caused
pecuniary damages and the amount of those damages. See State v. Houston, 2000 UT
App 242, K 12,9 P.3d 188; see also State v. Anderson. 833 P.2d 321, 323 (Or. Ct. App.
1992) ("The burden was on the state to prove the amount of restitution and it failed to do
that."). Additionally, the State must establish a "sufficient nexus" between the
defendant's "firmly established" criminal conduct and the victim's pecuniary damages.
State v. Watson. 1999 UT App 273, If 5, 987 P.2d 1289. Thus, restitution may not be
based upon mere inference alone. See id.
Perhaps the primary difference between restitution and ordinary sentencing is the
type of evidence that may be considered. In general, the sentencing court may take into
account a wide variety of information and circumstances. See e.g.. State v. Howell. 707
P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) (observing that "trial judges may receive and consider a wide
range of evidence concerning the defendant in fixing the penalty to be imposed for the
crime committed"); State v. Sanwick. 713 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1986) (stating that, in
determining sentence, court "'must be permitted to consider any and all information that
reasonably may bear on the proper sentence'") (quoting Wasman v. United States. 468
U.S. 559, 563 (1984)).
However, even in ordinary sentencing the scope of information considered is not
without limits. For example, "[t]he need for evidentiary reliability in sentencing
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proceedings is greater when specific factual issues must be resolved." State v. Johnson.
856 P.2d 1064,1071 (Utah 1993). The determination of whether a defendant's admitted
misconduct has resulted in pecuniary damages and the amount of those damages are just
such "specific factual issues" which require greater "evidentiary reliability" than ordinary
sentencing decisions.
Still, restitution requires even more, as evidenced by the strict limits that have
been imposed on what the sentencing court may consider in determining if restitution is
owed and, if so, what amount. See e ^ , State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, ^[3, 987
P.2d 1289 (interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 as requiring that court may order
restitution only if "defendant has been convicted of a crime that has resulted in pecuniary
damages and agrees to pay restitution or admits to the criminal conduct").
Finally, the restitution statute itself, at the very least, implies that restitution can
only be imposed based upon information that could be presented in court and would
support a civil judgment. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(l)(c) (1999) (defining the
"pecuniary damages" available in restitution as "all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action ")
(emphasis added). Obviously, inadmissible and inherently unreliable evidence could not
support a civil judgment.
In sum, due to its remedial goal, higher evidentiary standards have been imposed
for the determination of restitution than those required for ordinary sentencing. The

6

sentencing court failed to apply these higher standards, rendering the order of restitution
infirm. That failure affected the entire restitution decision. Furthermore, in its brief, the
State has also failed to recognize these differences as many of the cases cited by the State
deal strictly with ordinary sentencing and simply do not apply to restitution.
II.

THE SENTENCING COURT DID IN FACT ORDER RESTITUTION
BASED UPON CONDUCT FOR WHICH MS. MARTINEZ WAS NOT
CONVICTED, DID NOT ADMIT, OR DID NOT PLEAD GUILTY.
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief)

By not arguing to the contrary, the State's analysis essentially concedes that the
sentencing court erroneously considered Ms. Martinez5 alleged conduct in determining
restitution. In response to Ms. Martinez' claim, the State merely asserts that the
sentencing court had sufficient evidence with which to conclude that Ms. Martinez'
admitted misconduct of working under a false name resulted in $14,647 in pecuniary
damages to Workers' Compensation Fund ("WCF"). See. Appellee Br. at 7-10. The
State does not even attempt to argue that the sentencing court did not erroneously
consider allegations of conduct for which Ms. Martinez was not convicted, did not admit
responsibility, and did not plead guilty. Rather, the State points to selected and edited
statements of Dr. Dall and an anonymous WCF representative, which the State
apparently claims would have supported the court's restitution order, if the court had in
fact considered such information alone. See id. at 8-9.

7

Again, such an argument ignores that the sentencing court did in fact rely almost
exclusively upon alleged conduct for which Ms. Martinez was not convicted, did not
admit, or did not plead guilty. See R.77[7-21]. Not only did the sentencing court
erroneously consider such information, but it did so entirely in the context of restitution
and not other sentencing considerations such asfinesor jail time. See id.
In light of this, it is of no consequence that the State is able to cull from the record
three statements, taken out of context and/or edited, that may have supported the
restitution amount had the court in fact based restitution on that evidence. This is
especially true where, as is set forth below, the statements relied upon by the State are
wholly unreliable double, triple, and quadruple hearsay, demonstrably false, or directly
contradicted by more reliable evidence. As such, these statements can not form the basis
of any sentencing determination, let alone satisfy the higher standards required for an
order of restitution. See e.g.. Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071 (concluding that due process
requires that sentencing be based upon "reasonably reliable and relevant information'1).
As a preliminary matter, based on the record, it is quite simply impossible to
separate Ms. Martinez5 admitted misconduct from the allegations for which she was not
convicted, did not admit, or plead guilty. Because, the vast majority of the record is, at
the very least, ambiguous as to what conduct would have precluded Ms. Martinez from
being prescribed Oxycontin, attempts to separate the alleged conduct from her admitted
conduct are largely artificial and do not survive serious scrutiny.

8

For instance, the record is replete with statements related to Ms. Martinez'
"criminal conduct,1' R. 50, "fraudulent activities," R. 77[16], "extended abuse of
[Oxycontin]," R. 61 [6], and "false representations and omissions," R. 61 [4]. Yet,
nowhere are these statements defined. Do they refer to working under an assumed
name? Distributing Oxycontin? Obtaining Oxycontin by fraud? Or some combination
of the above? Given that the primary focus of the investigation, the PSR, and the
sentencing hearing was on the alleged conduct related to the dismissed charges, these
statements appear to refer to the conduct for which Ms. Martinez was not convicted, did
not admit responsibility, and did not plead guilty. Despite this, the State would have this
Court infer that these statements concern Ms. Martinez' admitted misconduct of working
under an assumed name. Nevertheless, restitution may not be based upon inference
alone. See Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at f3.
Yet another statement, while somewhat more clear than those above, actually
combines Ms. Martinez' admitted misconduct with the conduct for which the charges
were dismissed or amended to conclude that she would not have received Oxycontin.
Larry McDonald, an investigator for WCF, stated in a letter sent to the District Attorney
that "in light of Dyan Martinez' conviction of workers compensation fraud . . . and her
conviction of illegal distribution of a schedule 2 drug (the Oxycontin WCF paid for)
WCF would only accept responsibility from Dyan Martinez' continued medical care
excluding any further Oxycontin or narcotics." R. 45 (emphasis added).

9

Notwithstanding that this statement is erroneous because the charges related to
Oxycontin were either dismissed or amended, the statement only indicates that it was the
combination of Ms. Martinez' admitted misconduct and the unproven alleged conduct
related to Oxycontin distribution that would have precluded her from receiving
Oxycontin.
In fact, there are only two statements in the entire record that can fairly be read to
conclude that Ms. Martinez would not have received Oxycontin based upon her admitted
misconduct alone. Both of these statements are contained within the "Official Version of
Offense" section of the PSR, which is taken from the District Attorney's file and the
Probable Cause Statement and, thus, amounts to triple and quadruple hearsay.
R.61[2-5]. As set forth below, neither of these statements are reliable even under the
relaxed standards of ordinary sentencing.
The State first quotes a small portion of a statement made by an unidentified WCF
employee to conclude that "WCF would not have paid for defendant's Oxycontin 'had
they known of defendant[']s gainful employment.'" Appellee Br. at 8 (quoting R. 61 [4]).
However, the full quote from the PSR reads "WCF reports that had they known of
defendant Martinez' gainful employment under the assumed name, her medical and
prescription benefits would have been canceled, and no Oxycontin would have been
prescribed by Dr. Dall or paid for by WCF." R. 61 [4] (emphasis added). The
highlighted portion of this statement is demonstrably and admittedly false as
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Ms. Martinez' benefits cannot be terminated for any reason. See. Appellant Br. at 25 &
n.10 (describing that Ms. Martinez' medical and prescription benefits are irrevocable
regardless of any misconduct). In addition to being multiple hearsay from an
unidentified source, the fact that the highlighted portion of the statement is false sheds
serious doubt on the veracity of the entire statement, rendering it unreliable.
Furthermore, the statement is directly contradicted by Dr. Dall's own notes and
subsequent actions. In those notes, Dr. Dall specifically states that he would have
refused to prescribe Oxycontin solely on the basis of the alleged conduct regarding
"forging" prescriptions or "selling11 Oxycontin. R. 49. Nowhere in Dr. Dall's notes does
he mention any concern regarding sporadic part-time work, nor does he indicate that
Oxycontin would be an inappropriate medication based solely upon that part-time work.
Indeed, at the time Dr. Dall prescribed Oxycontin, Ms. Martinez had not. been working
for a full six months. R. 61[2].! Most telling about Dr. Dall's intentions and Ms.
Martinez' genuine need for Oxycontin is that, after the charges relating to Oxycontin had

1

According to the PSR, Ms. Martinez received Oxycontin from August 4, 1997
until March 4, 1999. However, Ms. Martinez worked part-time only from February 1996
to February of 1997 and then "in 1998 for a few months." R. 39. Therefore, Ms.
Martinez both worked part-time and received Oxycontin for only a "few months."
Indeed, at the time Ms. Martinez told Dr. Dall that she could not function without
additional pain medication, she had not been employed for a full six months and did not
restart her part-time job for another six months after receiving the Oxycontin. The State
made no showing that Ms. Martinez' part-time job six months previous would have
impacted upon her eligibility or need for Oxycontin. If anything, this evidence shows
that Oxycontin was an appropriate medication for Ms. Martinez' condition.
11

been dismissed or amended and Ms. Martinez had admitted to working under an assumed
name, Dr. Dall did in fact prescribe Oxycontin to Ms. Martinez. R. 61 [6].
Dr. Dall's notes and actions also contradict the only other statement which could
be read to conclude that he would not have prescribed Oxycontin had he been aware that
Ms. Martinez was previously employed. That statement reads "[o]n March 1,1999, Dr.
Dall told WCF investigator that if he had known that defendant Martinez was gainfully
employed under an alias, or was receiving approximately 360 Oxycontin lOmg pills per
month, he would not have prescribed Oxycontin for defendant.'1 R. 61 [3- 4].
Again, this statement is directly contradicted by Dr. Dall's own notes and actions
which indicate a lack of concern over Ms. Martinez' past employment. Moreover, this
quadruple hearsay statement comes through the victim in the case, further reducing its
reliability. See e ^ State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, ^[23,12 P.3d 110 (Billings, J.,
dissenting) (noting that due process concerns raised where "[restitution was thus based
upon the undocumented double hearsay proffered by the victims and Defendant was
denied an opportunity to cross examine the victims as to . . . the reasonableness of the . . .
costs"). Finally, as noted above, Ms. Martinez was not "gainfully employed" at the time
she initially was prescribed Oxycontin.
In conclusion, due primarily to the sentencing court's failure to adequately address
defense counsel's challenges to the information in the PSR, the record in this case is
something of a confused mess. Even viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it is
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simply unclear whether Ms. Martinez would have been precluded from receiving
Oxycontin based upon her admitted misconduct alone. The statements proffered by the
State in support of the sentencing court's order are unreliable in the extreme and do not
stand up to scrutiny. Moreover, the fact that Dr. Dall, with full knowledge of Ms.
Martinez5 admission of working under an assumed name, did prescribe Oxycontin as
soon as he learned that the charges of obtaining Oxycontin by fraud and distribution of
Oxycontin had been dismissed or amended provides powerful support for Ms. Martinez'
claim.
III.

RELIANCE ON THE TRIPLE AND QUADRUPLE HEARSAY OF THE
PSR WAS PLAIN ERROR.
(Reply to Point II of Appellee's Brief)

In its brief, the State appears to assert that presentence reports are somehow
immunefromthe clear requirements set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in State v.
Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1993). See Appellee's Br. at 11-17. Specifically, the
State contends that Johnson is limited by State v. Lipskv. 608 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1980),
and its progeny. Therefore, according to the State, Johnson should be interpreted as
holding that, absent a specific objection by the defendant, presentence reports are
inherently reliable regardless of their content or sources of information. See Appellee
Br. at 17.
In support of this novel interpretation of Johnson, the State asserts that "Utah
courts have consistently held that, unless 'the accuracy of a report is contested/ 'we must
13

presume that reports prepared by professional probation officers . . . are generally
reliable.'" Appellee Br. at 14 (quoting Gardner v. Florida. 430 U.S. 349, 359 (1977)).
Despite the State's assertion, no Utah case can be found that even cites Gardner for such
a proposition, let alone quote this dicta. Nor do the cases cited by the State 2 declare
presentence reports "generally reliable" or otherwise address the supposed inherent
reliability of presentence reports. Rather these cases merely establish that, at an absolute
minimum, due process requires that a defendant be allowed access to the presentence
report prior to the sentencing hearing and that he be allowed to raise objections and
inaccuracies to the report.
To further support its construction of Johnson, the State asserts that Johnson "cites
approvingly to Lipsky." Appellee Br. at 16. While, Johnson does cite to Lipsky. it does
so in an entirely different context than that urged by the State. See. Johnson, 856 P.2d at
1071, 1073 (citing Lipsky for propositions that "[t]he due process clause of both the
United States and Utah Constitutions 'requires that a sentencing judge act on reasonably
reliable and relevant information" and that "[t]o require a defendant to assume the burden
of disproving highly unreliable evidence might well violate due process").
Therefore, the Johnson court was well aware of Lipsky and its progeny, yet the

2

See Appellee Br. at 14-15 (citing State v. Gomez 887 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah
1994); State v. HowelL 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985); State v. Anderson. 632 P.2d 877,
878-79 (Utah 1981); State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1242 (Utah 1980); and State v.
Rhodes. 818 P.2d 1048, 1050-51 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)).
14

court chose not to exclude presentence reports, or any other evidence for that matter,
from the clear prohibition on double and triple hearsay. Such an obvious omission
renders the State's proposed interpretation of Johnson unsupportable.
Indeed, rather than restrict the application of Johnson, this Court has expanded
Johnson to apply to juvenile dispositional hearings. See. State ex rel W.S.. 939 P.2d 196,
199-201 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In W.S., an analogous situation to Ms. Martinez5 case,
the juvenile court relied upon a pre-disposition report prepared by a DCFS caseworker.
See id. The DCFS caseworker had no personal knowledge of the contested portion of
the report, rather, the caseworker had relied exclusively upon the records and reports of
Child Protective Services. See id Although this information was admissible for the
juvenile court's consideration, this Court applied Johnson and held that "double hearsay .
.. may not be the sole basis for disposition." Id, Similarly, in Ms. Martinez' case, the
preparer of the PSR had no personal knowledge of the contents of the report, but relied
solely upon the District Attorney's records andfilesfor the contested portion of the PSR,
the "Official Version of Offense."
Moreover, adoption of the State's interpretation would remove Johnson from
plain error consideration. If, as the State suggests, a specific objection is required to
invoke the due process protections set forth in Johnson and a condition precedent to plain
error review, plain error review would be both impossible and meaningless. Neither
Johnson itself nor any cases that have applied Johnson have imposed such a requirement.

15

That being said, even if the State's interpretation of Johnson was adopted, Ms.
Martinez5 claim still meets the requirements urged by the State. While Ms. Martinez did
not specifically object on hearsay or Johnson grounds, she did repeatedly challenge the
accuracy and reliability of the hearsay statements in the PSR.3
Ms. Martinez acknowledges that presentence reports have become an accepted
part of the sentencing determination. However, that acceptance does not exempt
presentence reportsfromthe requirements of due process. Being hearsay themselves,
presentence reports will always amount to double hearsay. Nevertheless, what is
particularly troubling about the PSR in this case, and what renders it infirm under due
process, is the PSR's inclusion and reliance on double and triple hearsay which makes
those portions of the PSR actually triple and quadruple hearsay. See. R. 61 [2-5].
Therefore, even if it was not included in the PSR, the only evidence which could
support the order of restitution is still double and triple hearsay. Moreover, this double

3

See R. 77[13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20]. For example, as to the quadruple hearsay
allegations in the PSR that Ms. Martinez was distributing Oxycontin, R. 61 [3- 4], defense
counsel stated "That is not right." R. 77[13]. As to the PSR's reliance upon multiple
hearsay through the victim to determine that Ms. Martinez caused $14,377 in pecuniary
damages as the cost of Oxycontin, defense counsel argued that Oxycontin would have
been prescribed even had her admitted misconduct been known since all charges related
to Oxycontin had been dismissed, that Ms. Martinez was entitled to receive appropriate
prescription benefits despite any misconduct, and that Oxycontin was an appropriate
medication regardless of her admitted misconduct. R. 77[14- 15, 20]. When the
sentencing court repeated the hearsay statements attributed to Dr. Dall made through
WCF in the PSR and that Methadone was an appropriate medication, defense counsel
argued that Dr. DalPs own notes contradicted these statements. R. 77[15, 19, 20].
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and triple hearsay lacks any other indicia of reliability. Namely and as discussed
previously, much of the hearsay comes through WCF, is demonstrably false, and is
directly contradicted by more reliable evidence. Such patently unreliable double and
triple hearsay does not somehow become reliable merely by its adoption in the PSR.
In light of defense counsel's repeated challenges to the PSR, the sentencing court
was on notice that the accuracy and reliability of the PSR was in serious question.
Furthermore, as described in both Appellant's opening brief and in Points II and IV of
this brief, the sentencing court was also on notice as to the PSR's unreliability due to its
inconsistencies and inclusion of false information. See Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071-72
(due process violated where report "contained numerous internal inconsistencies and
speculative conclusions based on incomplete factual information and questionable
factual assumptions"). The sentencing court's continued reliance upon the information
in the PSR in the face of the defense's challenges and the clear mandate of Johnson was
error, and that error was plain.
IV.

THE STATE HAS ATTEMPTED TO SHIFT THE BURDEN OF PROOF
ONTO MS. MARTINEZ.
(Reply to Point III of Appellee's Brief)

By asking Ms. Martinez to prove that she would have received Oxycontin despite
working under an assumed name, the State attempts to shift the burden of proof. The
State has the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence both that the
defendant's criminal conduct resulted in pecuniary damages and the amount of the
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damages. See State v. Houston. 2000 UT App 242,1f 12, 9 P.3d 188. The only burden
on Ms. Martinez is to show that the evidence was insufficient to support the
determination that Ms. Martinez' admitted misconduct resulted in pecuniary damage. In
other words, Ms. Martinez does not have the burden to show that she would have been
prescribed Oxycontin, but merely that the evidence does not show that she would not
have been prescribed Oxycontin. Nevertheless, as reviewed below, the evidence does in
fact show that Ms. Martinez would have continued to have been prescribed Oxycontin
regardless of her admitted misconduct.
A.

The State Presented No Reliable Evidence to Support the Sentencing
Court's Conclusion That Dr. Dall Would Not Have Prescribed Oxycontin
Had He Known Ms. Martinez Had Worked Under An Assumed Name.

In ordering restitution in this case, the sentencing court stated:
The basis, frankly, for the restitution, Mr. Dellapiana, is the statement
of Dr. Dall who is, after all, the person who writes the prescription, that had
he known that the defendant was gainfully employed under an alias or was
receiving an average of 360 Oxycontin pills per month he would not have
prescribed Oxycontin for the defendant.. . . The doctor tells me through the
(inaudible) investigator that he would not have made the prescription at all.
So, the legal basis for restitution is that she should not have, would not have
received Oxycontin
R. 77[15-16].
Given that the alleged conduct related to receiving excess Oxycontin could not
form the basis for the restitution order, See. Appellant's Br. at 18, the only basis
suggested by this conclusion that could support the order is the sentencing court's belief
that Dr. Dall would not have prescribed Oxycontin based upon Ms. Martinez' admitted
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misconduct of working under an assumed name alone. Despite this belief, the record
clearly indicates that Dr. Dall would, and did, prescribe Ms. Martinez Oxycontin
regardless of her previous employment.4
After the charges related to Oxycontin had been dismissed or amended and Ms.
Martinez had admitted to working under an assumed name, Dr. Dall did in fact prescribe
more Oxycontin to Ms. Martinez. R. 61 [6]. Even ignoring the evidence of Dr. DalFs
notes that Ms. Martinez' previous employment had absolutely no bearing upon the
appropriateness of Oxycontin, this fact alone completely contradicts the court's basis for
restitution, if not affirmatively establishes that Ms. Martinez would have continued to
receive Oxycontin prescriptions even though she worked part-time in the past.
B.

The Sentencing Court Had a Legal Duty to Determine the Actual
Damages Suffered By WCF.

The State also asserts that, since the sentencing court did not offset the cost of
Methadone against the award of pecuniary damages, Ms. Martinez' claim as to amount

4

As discussed in Point II of this brief, the only evidence supporting the court's
belief are the two statements in the PSR's "Official Version of Offense which read
"WCF reports that had they known of defendant Martinez' gainful employment under the
assumed name, her medical and prescription benefits would have been canceled, and no
Oxycontin would have been prescribed by Dr. Dall or paid for by WCF" and ,f[o]n March
1, 1999, Dr. Dall told WCF investigator that if he had known that defendant Martinez
was gainfully employed under an alias, or was receiving approximately 360 Oxycontin
lOmg pills per month, he would not have prescribed Oxycontin for defendant." R,
61 [3-4]. As outlined previously, these statements are extremely unreliable because they
are triple and quadruple hearsay, are directly contradicted by more reliable evidence, and
are demonstrably false.
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of restitution fails. Again, the State is attempting to shift the burden of proof onto Ms.
Martinez.
In addition to the State's burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the
amount of actual damages suffered by WCF, the sentencing court had a legal duty to
correctly apply the restitution statute and impose restitution based only on the actual
pecuniary damages incurred by WCF. According to the restitution statute, restitution is
available for only "pecuniary damages," which are defined as "all special damages."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(l)(c) (1999). The plain meaning of special damages are
actual damages or the actual pecuniary loss incurred by a defendant's conduct. See First
Security Bank of Utah. N.A. v. Banberrv Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Utah 1989).
Even accepting for the sake of argument that Ms. Martinez would not have
received Oxycontin, once she established that she was entitled to some medication
regardless of any misconduct, it was the State's burden to show and the sentencing
court's duty to determine what that medication was and its cost. Simply stated, WCF
suffered pecuniary damages, if at all, only in the amount they would not have had to pay
for Ms. Martinez' medical benefits. In this case, that amount is the cost of Oxycontin
minus the cost of the medication she would have been prescribed. Ms. Martinez did not
somehow adopt the burden to show what this cost was merely by pointing out to the
court that Methadone was not an appropriate medication with which to offset the cost of
Oxycontin.
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Lastly, the State suggests that defense counsel "invited any error by the trial
court's failure to consider other possible substitutes [to Oxycontin].'1 Appellee Br. at 24
n.3. Under the State's analysis, the error was invited because Ms. Martinez "neither
objected to [the sentencing court's decision to not offset the cost of Methadone] nor
offered any evidence that a different medication was a more appropriate substitute for
Oxycontin than methadone." Icl Once more, the State attempts to shift the burden.
As described in State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993), the invited
error doctrine was established to allow the trial court both an opportunity to address
claims of error and to "discourage parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so
as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal." Neither circumstance applies in
the instant case. First, the sentencing court had full opportunity to address the error of
not subtracting the value of an appropriate offset medicationfromthe cost of Oxycontin.
The court was aware that Methadone was an improper offset and that an offset was
required under the restitution statute. Second, defense counsel in no way mislead the
court, intentionally or otherwise, by correctly asserting that Methadone would not have
been prescribed to Ms. Martinez. See R. 77[ 19-20].
Defense counsel did not invite the error by correctly arguing that Methadone was
an improper offset medication due to Ms. Martinez' documented severe allergic reaction
to Methadone. Implicit in that argument is the notion that another, more appropriate
medication would have been prescribed and that medication should be used as an offset.
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Counsel did not argue, either expressly or impliedly, that no offset should be used
altogether. Thus, counsel cannot be said to have invited the court to refuse to offset the
cost of Oxycontin and actually increase the amount of restitution from that indicated in
the PSR. Cf State v. Betha. 957 P.2d 611,617 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (finding trial
court's error of failing to permit jury to know details and nature of prior conviction was
invited where counsel specifically requested that the trial court limit the evidence of the
prior conviction to fact of conviction alone, excluding any other reference to the
conviction).
Moreover, it is irrelevant in the context of invited error that defense counsel did
not object after the sentencing court had ruled that no offset medication would be used.
The State raised a similar argument in State v. Hoffine, 2001 UT 4, 20 P.3d 265, where
the defendant did not object after the trial court had made its ruling. In rejecting the
State's invited error claim, the Hoffine Court stated, "[w]e will not require a party to
continue to object once a motion has been made, and the trial court has rendered a
decision on the issue." IdL at ^[14.
In conclusion, once it was determined that Methadone would not have been
prescribed to Ms. Martinez in lieu of Oxycontin, it was the State's burden to show and
the sentencing court's duty to determine the actual damages suffered by WCF. The
State offered no such evidence and sentencing court neglected its duty by failing to
determine the appropriate offset medication.
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V.

MS. MARTINEZ' CLAIMS WERE ADEQUATELY BRIEFED .
(Reply to Point IV of Appellee's Brief)

Despite the State's argument to the contrary, Ms. Martinez' claim that the
sentencing court erred by failing to resolve or even address her objections, challenges,
and requested corrections to the contents of the PSR was adequately briefed. As such,
this issue should be addressed by this Court.
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, in relevant
part, that appellant's brief must contain "citations to the authorities, statues, and parts of
the record relied on." The State contends that Ms. Martinez' citations to the record did
not adequately cite to the objections and challenges to the accuracy of the PSR, stating
that "no explicit objections to defendant's PSI appear on those pages [cited by Ms.
Martinez]." See Appellee Br. at 26.
In support of her claim, Ms. Martinez cited to portions of the record in which
defense counsel brought to the sentencing court's attention the inaccuracies in the PSR.
See Appellant Br. at 28-30] (citing R. 77[7,11-13,17,19-20]). In each instance cited
by Ms. Martinez, the sentencing court made a statement based upon the information in
the PSR. Also in each instance, defense counsel specifically brought to the court's
attention that this information was not accurate. Whether these are deemed "explicit
objections" or not is immaterial as all that is required by the statute is that "any alleged
inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report... shall be brought to the attention
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of the sentencing judge." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (1999) (emphasis added).
As to the two claims that apparently were sufficiently briefed according to the
State's criteria, each has merit and should be addressed by this Court. First, defense
counsel asked the court for a "major correction or clarification" regarding allegations of
continuingfraudand participation in that fraud by defense counsel. R. 77[7]. The State
argues that since defense counsel asked for a "correction or clarification," the sentencing
court was relived of its clear duty under the statute to resolve inaccuracies in the PSR.
That argument is without merit. Regardless of the language used, defense counsel's
request was clear. Namely, that the information in the presentence report is inaccurate
and needs to be addressed. However, the sentencing court failed to address the
inaccuracy, ignoring the request and moving on to another subject. See R. 77[7].
Furthermore, the PSR, at the very least, adopted these inaccurate allegations. As
pointed out by the State, the PSR does not include the actual accusation of continuing
fraud. See Appellee Br. at 28. However, the PSR does include the statement of Larry
McDonald, the person making the allegation. See. R. 61 [6]. After recounting the factual
details of the allegation, the PSR states that Mr. McDonald "noted it is evident from Dr.
Dall's own notes that he is accepting the defendant's claim all drug charges pertaining
to Oxycontin has [sic] been dismissed despite his ongoing contact with WCF and the
fact that Ms. Martinez served several months in a federal prison." R. 61 [6] (emphasis
added). The clear import of this statement is that Ms. Martinez5 "claim" that the charges
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related to Oxycontin were dismissed is false and that defense counsel's notification of
Dr. Dall and WCF regarding this "claim" was aiding in that misrepresentation.
Finally, the State's assertion that the sentencing court adequately addressed
defense counsel's objection to the amount of restitution by not offsetting the cost of
Methadone is also without merit. Although he did specifically address the
inappropriateness of Methadone as a substitute medication, defense counsels's true and
overriding objection was to the accuracy of the amount of restitution suggested in the
PSR. See R. 77[17]. The sentencing court cannot be said to have adequately addressed
this inaccuracy within the meaning of the statute by refusing to determine an appropriate
offset medication and actually increasing the amount of restitution.
CONCLUSION
In light of the above, Ms. Martinez again respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the restitution order and remand for an additional hearing to determine the
appropriate amount of restitution and to make specific findings regarding the
inaccuracies in the PSR.
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